The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 20
Issue 1 Winter 2018

Article 5

August 2018

Assessing the Value of Ventures: Crowd Investors vs.
Sophisticated Investors
Marco Bade
Technische Universitaet Berlin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons,
and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Bade, Marco (2018) "Assessing the Value of Ventures: Crowd Investors vs. Sophisticated Investors," The
Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, pp. 1-11.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1325
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Assessing the Value of Ventures: Crowd Investors vs. Sophisticated Investors
Cover Page Footnote
I thank the Editor (Dr. Andrea Moro) and the anonymous Referee for constructive comments that
significantly improved the paper.

This article is available in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol20/
iss1/5

Assessing the Value of Ventures: Crowd
Investors vs. Sophisticated Investors
Marco Bade1

Abstract
Recent regulatory approaches in crowdfunding democratize capital markets. Adverse
wealth effects may arise because of information asymmetry. Firoozi et al. (2017) argue
that crowdfunding has wealth-reducing effects on crowd investors because they
systematically assign less value to good ventures, and more to bad ventures. This paper
aims to take a more differentiated perspective by incorporating two dimensions of
uncertainty determining ventures’ value. It further takes into account that different
investor types learn different information. This yields new findings concerning the
assessment of venture value by crowd investors and sophisticated investors. Crowd
investors’ may be able to better assess venture value, even though they have inferior
information processing skills. This may enable crowd investors to make better
investment decisions, compared to sophisticated investors.
Keywords: crowdfunding; crowd investors; sophisticated investors; wealth effects;
information asymmetry
JEL codes: D8; G14; G28; G32
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I.

Introduction

Crowdfunding is a novel way of financing new ventures. Instead of addressing a small
group of sophisticated investors to raise funds, ventures try to obtain funding from a
large group of (unsophisticated) investors. Each individual provides only a small
amount of money (Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). Recent regulatory approaches,
such as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 in the U.S., aim to
democratize capital markets in order to facilitate access of entrepreneurs to funding
from crowd investors. However, the democratization of capital markets goes hand in
hand with reduced investor protection, and thus bears the risk of adverse wealth effects.
In the academic debate, little consensus has been found yet given the fact that this is a
very young field of research. Agrawal et al. (2013) explain that crowdfunding faces two
problems related to asymmetric information: hidden information (adverse selection),
and hidden action (moral hazard). Ahlers et al. (2015) provide the first empirical study
in this context, and show that the provision of more detailed information about risk
and uncertainty by entrepreneurs can positively affect the probability of successful
funding. Courtney et al. (2017) propose that signals about project quality and founder
credibility may also mitigate information asymmetry, and thus increase the likelihood
of attaining funding.
To date, even less attention has been paid to adverse wealth effects among
different types of investors. Firoozi et al. (2017) are the first to investigate wealthreducing effects of crowdfunding on crowd investors, resulting from information
parity. The authors argue that there is substantial private information parity between
accredited traditional investors (for example, banks) and crowd investors. That is, small
crowd investors have fewer financial resources and less investing experience than large
accredited traditional investors do. The analysis of Firoozi et al. (2017) shows that
crowd investors assign less expected value to good ventures, and more to bad ventures,
compared to accredited traditional investors. This results from crowd investors’ general
disadvantage in processing signals disclosed by ventures.
However, this general assumption seems quite critical and may result in
misleading conclusions. It is indeed conceivable that crowd investors have inferior
information quality on average. Nevertheless, they may have information-related
advantages in certain areas. For example, crowd investors are typically also consumers
of the new product generating additional utility from community benefits, which are
tied to the future consumption experience (e.g., Belleflamme et al., 2014), and social
interaction realized through the participation in crowdfunding platforms or
communities (e.g., Gerber et al. , 2012; Belleflamme et al., 2013, 2014). This means,
crowd investors truly care for the product. Thus, they may have superior skills in
assessing product quality or future demand for the product. This enables them to
properly interpret signals about product-related uncertainty, even though they may be
unable to interpret other signals. More sophisticated investors, such as venture
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capitalists or banks, may still have better information quality, and an advantage in
processing signals about other sources of uncertainty.
Therefore, in order to portray a more realistic setting, the present paper
incorporates two dimensions of uncertainty, and takes into account that different types
of investors (crowd investors and sophisticated investors) may learn different
information. This yields new and more differentiated findings with respect to the
assessment of venture value by crowd investors and sophisticated investors. Hence,
this paper contributes to the emerging academic debate on (adverse) wealth effects
related to crowdfunding. In addition, it helps policy makers to further develop an
appropriate framework for crowdfunding.

II.

The model

Types of ventures
The economy in this model is populated by two types of ventures 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺, 𝐵} and two
groups of investors 𝑗 ∈ {𝑠, 𝑐}. One of the two ventures is good (index 𝐺), whereas the
other venture is bad (index 𝐵). At date t=1, the final value 𝑉𝑖 of venture 𝑖 is determined
by two sources of uncertainty:
𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝜇𝑖,1 + 𝛽2 𝜇𝑖,2 ,

(1)

where both ventures share common weights 𝛽1,2 > 0. These parameters represent the
weights of the two sources of uncertainty for the overall value of the venture. In other
words, 𝛽1,2 captures to what extend a venture’s risk depends on dimension 1 and
dimension 2. Below, I will elaborate on this in more detail. Consider two ventures
producing a very similar or complementary product, and thus facing a similar
composition of uncertainty. 𝜇𝑖,𝑛 , where 𝑛 ∈ {1, 2}, can be high (𝐻𝑖 > 0) or low (𝐿𝑖 =
0) with equal probability. 𝜇𝑖,𝑛 can be interpreted as stochastic shocks determining the
profitability of ventures. Each shock captures one dimension of uncertainty. The sum
of all shocks determines the ventures’ total risk and value. It is assumed that 𝐻𝐺 > 𝐻𝐵 ,
meaning that the good state of the good venture (high profitability) is better than the
good state of a bad venture. This simply captures that venture 𝐺 is more profitable
than venture 𝐵, even though both ventures being in a good state.
The rationale of two-dimensional uncertainty is as follows. Ventures are
regularly exposed to multiple sources of uncertainty, for example, demand for the firm's
products, production technology, idiosyncratic developments, macroeconomic
influences, management skills and experience, entrepreneurial competence, risk of
fraud, etc. In the present model, I subsume these risks into two categories. It is assumed
that 𝜇1 captures all sources of uncertainty related to the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial
3

team starting the venture (management-related risk), and 𝜇2 captures product-related
risks. Depending on the specific type of product, the weights of management-related
and product-related risk may differ. For example, if a venture offers a radically
innovative product, the most crucial source of uncertainty may be related to realizability
or implementabilty of the product, and to consumers’ acceptance, and thus demand
for the product. In this case, 𝛽2 is high. In contrast, if the venture aims to position
itself in a more mature market segment, the success of the venture rather depends on
the experience and skills of the entrepreneur or management to gain competitiveness
(high 𝛽1).
Of course, there are many other sources of uncertainty, which cannot be
collapsed under these two umbrella terms. For example, uncertainty around social
trends, economic conditions, political infrastructure, legal context, etc. Nevertheless,
the approach of modelling two dimensions of uncertainty is sufficient to capture the
main idea of the model, which is to show that different types of investors may learn
different information. Note that the considering n-dimensional uncertainty does not
change the results as long as one assumes that different types of investors have
information about different risk factors.
Types of investor groups
The two types of investors differ in terms of information processing skills. There is a
group of sophisticated investors (index 𝑠), such as venture capitalists, who have
superior skills in assessing the quality of business plans, management skills and
experience, etc. Such investors, who regularly provide management-consulting services,
may have high levels of expertise in terms of management. Previous research has
shown that entrepreneurial or managerial experience is a crucial factor determining
early performance of young ventures. Hence, it may also be the most important driver
of venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Traditionally, venture capitalists put much
weight on entrepreneurial experience when evaluating the attractiveness of new
ventures (Stuart and Abetti, 1990). Based on a survey among 100 venture capitalists,
MacMillan et al. (1985) identify the criteria, which are the most important drivers of
venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Five of the ten most important factors are
directly related to the characteristics of the entrepreneurs themselves. Consistent with
this, Hsu (2007) finds evidence that prior entrepreneurial experience increases both the
likelihood of venture capital funding and venture valuation. These findings stress
venture capitalists’ strong focus on the management/entrepreneur-related dimension
of ventures, which seems to dominate dimensions related to the market, product, or
strategy. This is why I assume that sophisticated investors have the exclusive ability to
process information related to the ventures’ management.
Besides the sophisticated investors, there is a group of unsophisticated
investors (the crowd, indexed by 𝑐) with inferior information processing skills, but
4

better sense of product quality. Crowd investors’ activities are much more driven by
the product-related dimension. They actively engage in product development, quality
reassurance, experience sharing, and joint consumption (Ouwersloot and OderkerkenSchroder, 2008). Hence, crowd investors interact, share their contributions, and
observe others’ contributions and experiences. They build up their own contributions
using other crowd investors’ suggestions to end up with better overall solutions (Lévy,
1997; Surowiecki, 2004; Brabham, 2008a, 2008b; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010).2
This facilitates learning of product quality (Gerber et al., 2012; Belleflamme et al., 2013,
2014). Hence, I assume that crowd investors are superior in processing product-related
information.
At date t=0, ventures signal whether they are good or bad, and disclose
information regarding management, information about technology and the product,
marketing and industry-specific information, and other relevant operational and
financial strategies within the business plan. Thus, all investors receive a set of public
signals about the two dimensions of uncertainty. Given different experience and skills
to process these signals, the two groups of investors update their beliefs with different
precision. Based on the discussion above, it is assumed that sophisticated investors are
only able to process public information (set of signals 𝑌𝑠 ) about management-related
risks (𝜇1 ), whereas the crowd only learns product-related information, that is, a set of
signals 𝑌𝑐 about 𝜇2 . Information quality of sophisticated investors is defined as
follows:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑠 = 𝐻𝑖 |𝜇𝑖,1 = 𝐻𝑖 ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑠 = 0|𝜇𝑖,1 = 0) = 𝛾𝑠 ,
1

(2)

1

where 𝛾𝑠 ∈ [2 , 1]. If information quality is low (𝛾𝑠 = 2), the probability of having a
correct signal is 50 percent. If 𝛾𝑠 = 1, this means that the accuracy of information
processing is 100 percent. Analogously, crowd investors’ information quality is given
by:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑐 = 𝐻𝑖 |𝜇𝑖,2 = 𝐻𝑖 ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑐 = 0|𝜇𝑖,2 = 0) = 𝛾𝑐 .

(3)

Note that, in order to nest this model in previous literature (e.g., Firoozi et al.,
2017), I assume:
𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐 .

2

(4)

In the literature, this mechanism creates the so-called “wisdom of crowds“.
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This captures that sophisticated investors have fundamentally superior skills in
processing information in general, compared to less experienced average crowd
investors.

III.

Results

Investor expectations
After receiving signals at date t=0, investors try to assess the ventures’ future value,
which eventually guides investment decisions. Note that these investments are not
explicitly modeled in this paper. The expectations of sophisticated and crowd investors
about the good venture’s future value are given by:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐺 ) = 𝛽1 ∙

𝛾⏟
𝑠 𝐻𝐺

+ 𝛽2 ∙

𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇1

𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐺 ) = 𝛽1

𝐻𝐺
⏟
2
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇1

𝐻𝐺
⏟
2

=

𝐻𝐺
(2𝛽1 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽2 ),
2

𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇2

+ 𝛽2

𝛾⏟
𝑐 𝐻𝐺
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇2

=

𝐻𝐺
(𝛽 + 2𝛽2 𝛾𝑐 ).
2 1

(5)

(6)

In determining expectations about ventures’ future value, investors use all
information available to them, and their skills to process information. Recall that,
typically, different types of investors have different skills to process information, and
focus on different types of information. Hence, in this model, these skills only affect
the expectation of one of the two sources of uncertainty because each type of investor
only has information about one source of uncertainty. For example, sophisticated
investors’ expectation of the good venture’s future value 𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐺 ) is determined by two
components: The first component represents their expectation about management risk
(𝜇1 ) conditional on their (positive) information about 𝜇1 . Given a positive signal, in
expectation, this component is in a good state 𝐻𝐺 with probability 𝛾𝑠 , which represents
the skills to process information about management-related uncertainty of
sophisticated investors. In other words, given positive information about venture 𝐺,
sophisticated investors expect the good venture to have a good management with
probability 𝛾𝑠 . This component is weighted by 𝛽1 measuring the impact of
management-related factors. The second component is the unconditional expectation
about the other source of uncertainty (𝜇2 ), weighted by 𝛽2. Given sophisticated
investors have no information about product-related factors, they expect 𝜇2 to be in a
6

1

good state 𝐻𝐺 with probability 2. Analogously, the two groups of investors expect the
bad venture’s value to be:
𝐻𝐵
𝐻𝐵
(2𝛽1 (1 − 𝛾𝑠 ) + 𝛽2 ),
=
2
2

(7)

𝐻𝐵
𝐻𝐵
+ 𝛽2 (1 − 𝛾𝑐 )𝐻𝐵 =
(𝛽 + 2𝛽2 (1 − 𝛾𝑐 )).
2
2 1

(8)

𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐵 ) = 𝛽1 (1 − 𝛾𝑠 )𝐻𝐵 + 𝛽2
𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐵 ) = 𝛽1

The idea is that investors today seek to invest into ventures with good prospects
and high expected future value. With the same initial value, the venture with the higher
expected future value represents the more attractive investment. In the absence of
further information, investors can mostly only make their investment decisions on the
basis of expectations and perceived risk.
Benchmark case
Before presenting the main results, I consider the case 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 as a benchmark, which
yields results consistent with previous literature. Given 𝛽1 = 𝛽2, investors’
expectations about the good venture’s value can be rewritten as follows:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐺 ) =

𝐻𝐺
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠 ),
2

(9)

𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐺 ) =

𝐻𝐺
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐 ).
2

(10)

Crowd investors have less optimistic expectations about the value of the good
venture than sophisticated investors, that is:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐺 ) > 𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐺 )

(11)

𝐻𝐺
𝐻𝐺
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠 ) >
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐 ),
2
2

(12)

because 𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐 . On the other hand, however, crowd investors are more optimistic in
forecasting the value of bad ventures:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐵 ) =

𝐻𝐵
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑠 )),
2

(13)
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𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐵 ) =

𝐻𝐵
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑐 )),
2

(14)

and thus:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐵 ) < 𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐵 )

(15)

𝐻𝐵
𝐻𝐵
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑠 )) <
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑐 )),
2
2

(16)

because 𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐 .
In this benchmark case, the two dimensions of uncertainty have equal weights.
Thus, information about 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 is equally valuable, and information advantages of
sophisticated investors solely arise from information quality (𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐 ). Given that
sophisticated investors have superior information processing skills, they have an overall
advantage over crowd investors in assessing the ventures’ value. This results in adverse
wealth effects for crowd investors because they assign a smaller expected value to good
ventures, and a larger expected value to bad ventures, compared to sophisticated
investors. Thus, crowd investors tend to invest less than sophisticated investors in good
ventures and more in bad ventures (Firoozi et al., 2017).
Key results
In this subsection, I present the main results of the model by showing that, depending
on 𝛽1,2, crowd investors may assign more expected value to good ventures, and less
expected value to bad ventures, even though having inferior information processing
skills. Regarding the good venture, comparison of expectations of sophisticated and
crowd investors yields the following condition:
𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐺 ) < 𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐺 )

(17)

𝐻𝐺
𝐻𝐺
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠 ) <
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐 ),
2
2

(18)

2𝛽1 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽2 < 𝛽1 + 2𝛽2 𝛾𝑐

(19)

𝛽1 2𝛾𝑐 − 1
<
.
𝛽2 2𝛾𝑠 − 1

(20)

if and only if:
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Compared to sophisticated investors, crowd investors assign more expected
value to good ventures if and only if the relative weight of 𝛽1 is sufficiently small. Given
𝛾𝑐 < 𝛾𝑠 , the right hand side of the above condition is smaller than one. This implies
that 𝛽1 necessarily needs to be smaller than 𝛽2. Similarly, in the case of assessing the
bad venture’s value, it can be shown that 𝐸𝑠 (𝑉𝐵 ) > 𝐸𝑐 (𝑉𝐵 ), if and only the above
condition is satisfied. Hence, crowd investors have less optimistic expectations about
the bad venture’s value if 𝛽1 is sufficiently small.
This implies that, even though having worse information quality, crowd investors
tend to invest more than sophisticated investors in good ventures, and less in bad
ventures, if the impact of product-related sources of uncertainty, measured by 𝛽2, is
high. Thus, if the ventures’ value depends on the product-related dimension, rather
than the management-related dimension, crowd investors may have an information
advantage over sophisticated investors having better information quality.

IV.

Concluding remarks

Startups are a leading source of economic growth and job creation. For example, the
Business Dynamics Statistics show that startups create most of the new net jobs in the
US. Startups are responsible for all net job creation during most years considered in
the statistics. Young (aged less than one year) of existence add an average of 3 million
jobs per year. Existing firms (aged one year and older) create one-tenth the jobs created
by startups. Considering the job destruction rates, existing firms are usually net job
losers (e.g., Kane, 2010; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Yet, startups still face many
difficulties. This is why policy makers around the world are currently updating existing
regulations, and developing and implementing new regulatory frameworks for startups
(e.g., Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). One recent regulatory approach is the JOBS
Act of 2012, which aims to incorporate smaller investors, such as crowd investors, into
capital markets. However, the democratization of capital markets bears the risk of
adverse wealth effects at the expense of crowd investors. As shown by Firoozi et al.
(2017), and in the benchmark case in this model, crowd investors with inferior
information processing skills may inefficiently invest less in good ventures, and more
in bad ventures, compared to sophisticated investors. This calls for more protection of
crowd investors.
However, the findings from the extended setting in this paper suggest that this
is not generally valid. Therefore, policy makers need to take a more differentiated
perspective before implementing hasty investor protection measures. The present
model demonstrates that the exact opposite is also possible as crowd investors may
have an information advantage over sophisticated investors, for example, in terms of
the product-related factors, which enables crowd investors to better assess ventures’
9

expected value, even though they have inferior information quality. This may enable
crowd investors to make better investment decisions, compared to sophisticated
investors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that markets (in this paper represented
by the crowd) may be superior to intermediaries (in this paper represented by
sophisticated investors) in evaluating projects (Allen and Gale, 1999). To be clear, this
paper assumes crowd investors to have inferior skills to process information, but to be
superior to sophisticated investors if they simply learn information about factors, which
are more relevant for venture value. Thus, the present paper suggests that the
hypothesis is true if, for example, the product-related dimension dominates the
management-related dimension of the venture.
The present paper thus argues against the proposition that crowdfunding may
be wealth-reducing only for crowd investors due to inferior information processing
skills. However, it would go too far to recommend that crowd investors should not be
protected based on this finding. It does not matter who benefits at what cost. Instead,
in order to avoid adverse wealth effects among different types of investors, regulators
should promote precise and reliable disclosure of all venture-related information in
order to level the playing field among investors (e.g., Hazen, 2012; Heminway, 2014).
The disclosing firms need to take into account the different experiences and skills to
process public information (as also featured in the present model) among investors.
Furthermore, regulators should obligate crowdfunding platforms to make available and
maintain communication channels for investors in order to facilitate information flows
among investors. Funding portals offer excellent regulatory access. In addition, the
establishment of minimum standards for due diligence by the crowdfunding portals
would make sense. Such due diligence could provide background checks on the
entrepreneurial team of the venture, the competitive situation in the respective market,
or simply the product quality. This could help investors with inferior skills to assess
multiple dimensions of venture value. Lastly, better investor education and tests with
the aim to clarify for investors the risks of investing in young ventures could reduce
the gap in terms of both accessing and processing information relevant for investments
(Kloehn et al., 2016). All of these measures might reduce information asymmetry and
thus help avoid adverse wealth effects. For a deeper understanding of the issues
emerging from the findings in this paper, future research should endogenize, for
example, the information production of investors, and the allocation of weights of the
different dimensions determining ventures’ payoff and risk structure.
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